Following this, I demonstrate why well-being, understood as a normative rather than a purely descriptive conception of personal happiness, nevertheless cannot serve as a normative reason in the political domain. Next, I relate the distinction between the political and the personal to the distinction between having normative reasons for a particular political arrangement and merely having a ‘pro-attitude’ towards a state of affairs that accords with one's preferred definition of happiness. I begin by outlining the main features of public happiness as an Enlightenment ideal. Public happiness is presented as a feature of the system of right that defines the political relationship between citizens, as opposed to their personal mental states, desires or well-being. In this paper, I defend a conception of public happiness that is distinct from private or first-person happiness. Theories of happiness usually consider happiness as something that matters to us from a first-person perspective.
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